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 One of the most noticeable aspects of the demonstrations in Iran in the summer 
of 2009, in the protests against authoritarian regimes across the Arab world two years 
later and in the ‘Occupy’ movements in the West is the very significant participation of 
students and young people. This public behavior strengthened the assumption that 
young people’s activism and more specifically student activism is inherently or 
naturally rebellious, confrontational and somewhat anti-system whatever the actual 
system in place might be.1 Along with this argument, some scholars have highlighted 
that students have peculiar characteristics - they are committed to criticism of the status 
quo, live in a universe governed by qualitative values where actions are motivated by 
truth, justice, freedom and transformation of the world -2 which in authoritarian settings 
or developing countries are associated to the dissatisfaction with traditional society and 
efforts of modernize it.3 Here, students are often perceived to be at the forefront of pro-
democracy demonstrations against regimes of radically different nature, ranging from 
the anti-communist protesters in Tien-An-Men Square to the Chilean and Argentinean 
student unions challenging military rule.4 However, scholars recognize that student 
movements have an ambiguous relationship with democratization and this article, 
through an exploration of the Iranian case, highlights such ambiguities and explains the 
way in which student activism is also shaped by and indebted to authoritarian structures 
to attain its objectives. This is in line with the findings from other sectors of civil 
society activism in authoritarian settings whereby broader political goals such as 
democratization can be sacrificed if sectorial benefits can be achieved through co-
operation with and co-optation by authoritarian ruling elites.5 Student activism in 
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authoritarian settings is under-researched and this article fills an important empirical 
gap by problematising the nature of such activism, which still characterizes societies 
across the globe. Thus, the assumption here is that student activism sometimes promotes 
democratic rule and sometimes, on the contrary, strengthens authoritarianism. An 
investigation of the conditions under which these different outcomes occur is both 
academically important and politically timely given the re-politicization of youth, 
particularly in the Middle East, but also in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
elsewhere.6 In the case of post-revolutionary Iran, the scholarship has underlined the 
role of the students in both violently supporting the regime’s policies during the early 
1980s7 and in promoting the pro-democracy program of the reformist Khatami’s 
governments during the late 1990s and 2000s.8 A number of questions arise from this 
example: how can we make sense of such a shift? How patterns of conflict and 
cooperation between the Iranian regime and the student organization(s) are related to the 
debate on democratization and authoritarian resilience?  
This article aims at shedding light on the shift between cooperation and 
opposition that characterises the relations between student activist groups and the 
Iranian regime, but also examines the unintended consequences of student activism 
whereby even a radical and genuine engagement for democracy can be detrimental to 
the forces more committed to its realization by helping a conservative backlash.9 This is 
what happened after 2005 in Iran, when Ahmadinejad won his first presidential term 
after eight years of reformist rule.  
 The seemingly competing literatures on democratisation and authoritarian 
resilience often highlight the role of civil society movements and actors in closed 
societies pointing to the different mechanisms and conditions under which they can be 
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successful promoters of political change or, conversely, how they can become, even 
unwillingly, pillars of the authoritarian regime.10 In this context, while the relationship 
between student activism and democratisation is often examined in the literature, the 
one between student politics and authoritarianism is less explored, although there is a 
considerable amount of studies available that deal with the ways in which opposition 
social and civil movements can be tamed and brought back in line with the authoritarian 
regime.11  Using the case of student activism in post-revolutionary Iran, and elaborating 
on the literature on civil activism under authoritarianism, this study examines the 
patterns of cooperation and conflict between the regime and the students and how they 
are related to democratic advancements or authoritarian resilience. In fact student 
movements in authoritarian settings do not always remain on a fixed position; rather, 
they often shift between co-optation, cooperation and conflict with the regime. This 
happens according to a number of variables such as the structure of opportunities, the 
students’ mission and path-dependent evolution, the demographic composition of 
student groups and factional politics, namely whether the students and the government 
are loyal to competing or allied factions.  
Furthermore, even when student activism is radical in its demands for political 
change and manages to avoid co-optation, it may be incapable of fostering democracy 
since its radicalism might lead to marginalization. The case-study of the relation 
between the Iranian student movement as embodied by the Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat -e 
Howzeh va Daneshgah (Office for the Strengthening of Unity between the Islamic 
Schools and the Universities, DTV) and the regime not only shows how changing 
patterns of cooperation and conflict may work. It also shows that co-optation and 
control have limitations, such as the path-dependent identity of student movements, 
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based on the idea of students as an uncompromising political actor.  The case-study also 
sheds light on the regime’s reaction to these shifts in students’ activism and on the 
patterns of political marginalization. Avoiding co-optation may greatly reduce the risk 
of student activism being tamed, but it could undermine its political relevance, leading 
to political marginality which, in turn, does not help the cause of democratic activism. 
The mechanisms the authoritarian regime uses to marginalise students when they do not 
‘comply’ contribute to explain why the politics of student activism in Iran might be 
more complex than superficial analyses about its pro-democratic stances and role 
suggest.  
  
Unintended Consequences of Student Activism between Democratization and 
authoritarian Resilience 
The literatures on democratization and authoritarian resilience are not the only 
ones that examine student politics and activism, but are centrally concerned with the 
role of students in promoting or weakening democratisation. Sociological studies on 
students and ‘new social movements’ obviously influenced the comparative politics 
literature focusing on student activism, democratic transition and consolidation. In the 
context of democratization studies, it is generally postulated that the growth of civil 
society in authoritarian contexts is per se a positive development because it creates 
pressure on the regime to progressively give in to the demands of organised and 
autonomous groups thereby unleashing a liberalizing and then democratising process.12 
Student activism is conceived to be part of such growing civil society and it is believed 
to challenge the authoritarianism of the system through its activities.13 One can find 
examples of this in the leading role that students played for instance in the 
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democratization of South Korea, Mali, Portugal and Indonesia.14 It is here that student 
activism deserves to be analysed because the role of civil society in processes of 
democratization is no longer as unproblematic as it used to be.   
However, more recent studies question the centrality of civil society activism in 
processes of democratization and argue quite convincingly that in authoritarian settings 
the growth of civil society can also strengthen the authoritarian regime.15 This approach 
contends that civil society groups and associations that constitute the ‘opposition’ 
inevitably tend to play the game the regime has set up and indirectly strengthen it by 
replicating and using the same authoritarian networks and norms that the regime 
utilizes. This means that strategies of co-optation and control all prevent civil society 
from playing the democratizing role that many have assigned to it. This happens in the 
case of student movements as well.16 In examining a number of student protests in 
Africa since the 1960s John A. Nkinyangi concludes that they created:  
 
‘the necessary social and political environment for the military to intervene. Given 
the present stage in the development of Africa’s social forces, this might very well 
be the historic role that student activism […] may play for some foreseeable time in 
the future. The absence of an alternative social force capable of countervailing the 
existing oligarchy and of wielding State power creates a vacuum, thus making 
intervention by the military inevitable.’17  
 
In many ways it is the same problem that Jamal had identified with civil society 
activism in general. She argued that the crucial differences in civil society activism are 
not to be found in the actors of civil society themselves and their values or ethos, but in 
the constraints in place that determine the way in which such groups behave. Thus, 
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there is a considerable difference in ‘being’ a civil society actor where democratic and 
liberal institutions are in place and ‘being’ one under authoritarian constraints.18 It is at 
this junction that sociological studies on the progressive role of student movements in 
established democracies tend to obscure the reality of what happens in authoritarian 
contexts because they apply the same framework they use when dealing with student 
activism in established democracies.19 This framework is based on the idea that student 
activism is autonomous and independent and that, almost by nature, serves only 
progressive causes. The problem is that this framework does not really ‘travel’ when it 
comes to authoritarian countries.  
To highlight the ‘dark side’ of activism in authoritarian settings, scholars have 
used the concepts of co-optation, ‘embedded activism,’ and control. In these 
authoritarian settings universities are embedded in the political system through violent 
repression (rarely), coercion (at times), and cooptation (often) of activists within the 
rank-and-files of the regime institutions. The taming of universities passes through 
reforms20 as well as a massive substitution of academic appointees or the cutting of 
financial support to student activities within the campus.21 In the case of Iran, others 
have shown the relevance of entrance examinations to influence the student body’s 
political attitudes.22 The Iranian regime’s goals in adopting such measures may be 
different, ranging from a complete eradication of student activism to its normalization.23 
Although these operations might normally be carried out against the will of activists, it 
is important to remember that ‘normalised’ and tamed student organizations may have, 
in return, access to benefits in terms of political relevance and may be convinced to 
have better opportunities to voice their discontent if allied to the regime. Interestingly 
enough, Iranian student politics boosted researchers’ enthusiasm only after Khatami 
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won the election in 1997 and the discourse on civil society and democratization entered 
the public debate. Students’ mobilization was then one of the elements used to explain 
Khatami’s success and to predict a transition to democracy.24  
On the contrary, previous scholarly production on Iranian student politics examined the 
control the newborn regime exerted on the campuses just after the revolution. Beyond 
academia, student activists or former activists have talked up the importance of the 
student movement conflating it within the transitology paradigm.25 This representation 
is so strong that many among them support the idea that when the student organisations 
were helping the regime in strengthening the Islamic state, after the 1979 revolution, 
‘there was no student movement.’26  
Nevertheless, despite the failure of the normative perspective on civil society’s 
activism, this approach has identified correctly the opening up of new spaces of 
confrontation between the regime and non-state political actors. Although not leading to 
a process of democratization, this has resulted in a ‘pluralisation of the power relations 
with the regime’27 and brought about ‘unintended consequences’ of embedded activism. 
Instead of reproducing subjugation, some social actors have found in this relationship 
room for some political autonomy and have changed their attitudes towards the 
regime.28 That is why Iranian students’ reactions to the mechanisms of control, 
domination and co-optation enacted by the regime have varied from co-operation to 
conflict since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. In the following section 
detailed empirical evidence is presented to substantiate the complex relation that student 
activism in Iran has with democratization and authoritarian resilience. In turn the 
Iranian example can shed some light on student activism in other authoritarian states 
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where young people may in fact mobilize in favor of democracy, but obtain the 
paradoxical outcome of strengthening authoritarianism.   
 
Student Activism in Iran: History, Organizations, and Politics since the 1979 
Revolution 
 Student activism has become a prominent feature of Iranian politics, although 
higher education is a rather recent phenomenon. It is under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
(1941-79) that a significant development of third-level education occurred. In addition 
to building new universities and making access to them easier, he also increased the 
number of scholarships available to study abroad, a move which ironically helped the 
anti-Shah students to organize in a freer environment.29 During the period between 1977 
and 1979, when the revolution erupted, every political group established its own 
headquarters on the campuses, which became the most active political loci in Iran to the 
point that the then provisional post-revolutionary government was afraid of losing 
control over them. Due to the chaotic situation across universities following the 
revolution, in 1980 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for a ‘Cultural Revolution’ to 
clean up the campuses from Westernised staff and immorality with the rather evident 
intent of placing his loyalists in charge and to Islamise the universities, considered the 
hotbeds of secularism. In order to achieve this objective, universities were shut down 
until 1983. By then, the Islamisation of the universities was completed through massive 
purges,30 the hiring of new faculty members and the admission of new students after 
proper ‘political screening’.31 Thus, when the universities were finally re-opened, a 
significant process of restructuration had taken place: the Islamist faction of the 
revolutionary coalition, which had won the struggle against the secular and leftist 
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revolutionary factions to establish an Islamic state, had taken control of the campuses 
through the DTV. This organization originated from the semi-legal pre-revolutionary 
Muslim Students Associations, which included the most radical individuals of the 
Khomeinist faction and the so-called Islamic leftists, a powerful faction within the 
Islamist winning coalition that stood for social equality and wealth redistribution and 
with a strong Islamist agenda on cultural and educational issues. The new DTV is an 
umbrella organization whose central office coordinates all the Islamic associations in 
the universities. For many years to come it would constitute the main networking hub 
for politically active students. Since then and until the early 1990s, the cultural and 
political hegemony of the Islamic left was established within universities through the 
DTV, which acted in harmony with the political and institutional establishment of the 
Islamic Republic, far from any call for a democratic system. This indicates that the issue 
of authoritarian versus democratic politics is not necessarily the most prominent one for 
students. They might instead concentrate on fulfilling an ideological, messianic role, 
such as Islamising universities, whose benefits, such as the monopoly over students’ 
activities and a short-cut access to the regime’s political and intellectual elite, go well 
beyond the type of political system in place.   
 The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989 introduced a new era in Iranian politics and by extension in the universities. A 
new President of the Republic, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was elected and a new Supreme 
Leader was nominated, Ayatollah Khamenei. Both men were hostile to the Islamic left. 
DTV was then the only student organisation in the country and since it was strongly 
linked to the Islamic left the government attempted to weaken it through bureaucratic 
mechanisms. First was the permission given to other student organisations to be set up, 
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which led to the student bassij units and the Islamic Association of the Student Bassij32 
being established. This obviously challenged the monopoly of DTV on student politics. 
Second, new guidelines for choosing university councils and presidents were approved, 
which made it impossible for Islamic leftist students to participate in such councils and 
influence the nomination of the highest university officials, who decided on the legal 
status of student associations. Finally, the Office of Representatives of the Supreme 
Leader, which had a permanent presence in universities,33 was established to control 
student activism and it actively discouraged students from joining DTV. These 
bureaucratic measures were implemented in a political climate hostile to the Islamic left 
with conservative voices calling for the dismantling of DTV altogether because it had 
fulfilled its historical role of Islamising universities.34  
 The early 1990s witnessed therefore the reconfiguration of student activism and 
DTV’s own changes reflected the shifting balance of power within the political system. 
This indicates that student activism not only does not take place in an autonomous 
vacuum independent from the political system as it might happen in established 
democracies, but it becomes an instrument of power struggles where mobilisation of 
students in favour of governmental agendas occurs. By the early 1990s, DTV was 
operating in a very hostile context, but remained very much aligned to the Islamic left 
despite its decreasing political power. The shifting balance of power at national level 
with the Islamic left under attack from the conservatives had profound repercussions on 
campus politics and on DTV. First of all, rather than leading to the marginalization of 
DTV, the mechanisms to curb it put in place by the conservatives and particularly the 
presence of rival student organisations encouraged DTV to radicalise its positions vis à 
vis the conservative-dominated regime. Where once the DTV held the monopoly of 
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power on campuses and had in the regime a precious ally, in the new ‘conservative era’ 
this monopoly was broken leading DTV to become aware of the necessity of competing 
politically with other organisations for the support of students. Part of this process of 
differentiation from rival student organisations was for DTV to embrace a discourse that 
championed political pluralism and democracy that should be reflected at all levels of 
society, including universities. Up to that moment, the bassij and DTV were not very 
different: both organizations found in anti-imperialism, religion and social equality their 
guiding principles, but now DTV ‘found’ that democracy and freedom of expression 
were inalienable rights too.35 This embrace of political pluralism was the result of inter-
linked internal and external factors. The most significant external change was the 
progressive marginalisation of the Islamic left from positions of power in political, 
economic and cultural institutions across the country. This meant that the dismissal 
from power of prominent Islamic leftists led to a profound re-think among Islamic 
leftist intellectuals of the values and institutions that should underpin the Islamic 
Republic. This new intellectual thinking veered towards democratising the political 
system and introducing genuine political pluralism.36 It was inevitable that this 
important ideological shift within the Islamic left would filter down to the universities 
and more specifically to DTV. This realisation on the part of members of DTV that 
democracy was a crucial value to promote came largely through the lectures of 
Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar who had been prominent revolutionaries, 
leading members of the Islamic left and, crucially, professors at University of Tehran 
and Tarbiat Modarres University respectively.37 Their calls for Islamic reformation, 
religious and social tolerance, and the construction of an ‘open society’ enriched the 
national and international debate on reformism and the compatibility between Islam and 
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democracy.38 The second significant external factor to impact on DTV’s ideological 
shift was the massive increase in the number of students attending university, which had 
gone from 140,000 in 1977-1978 to 1,150,000 in 1996.39 This growth was primarily due 
to the substantial number of females enrolling in university. This new cohort of students 
came with new attitudes and ideas about politics and how it should be conducted both at 
the national and university level. New generations brought in new ideas. The internal 
mechanism that allowed the embrace of democracy on the part of DTV was a change in 
the electoral rules.40 In 1993 the political screening of both candidates and voters was 
abandoned, allowing for free elections to the Central Committee of DTV. This meant 
that DTV started to attract people with different views and opinions, losing the early 
ideological centralism.41 Faculty members became more politically diversified too, 
stimulating the differentiation of student movements. 
 By the mid-1990s, the universities mirrored broader social and political 
transformations and affected the way in which student activism took place. The crucial 
point here is the shift away from the monopoly of power of DTV on campuses and its 
unconditional support for the regime towards a competitive environment. In such an 
environment different student organisations battled it out ideologically with DTV 
embracing political pluralism and democratic tolerance in open contrast with what it had 
stood for during the 1980s and early 1990s. In this case, the DTV had changed and 
shifted positions rather rationally, without necessarily follow a straight and unchanging 
ideological line which was neither consistently anti-regime nor pro-regime. Beyond the 
demographical data and sincere commitment, there is always a degree of political 
opportunism at play. For instance, DTV’s embrace of pluralism came as a by-product of 
the ‘elimination’ of the Islamic left from positions of power. Once out of power, 
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political pluralism was invoked to reform the regime that had ‘fallen’ into the hands of 
the conservatives. In turn this means that the ruling elites with their actions can and do 
shape what occurs on university campuses. This would become very clear when 
Khatami decided to run for President in 1997 as the representative of the Islamic left 
now turned reformist.   
 
Between Cooperation and Conflict: Student Activism in Khatami’s Era. Patterns 
of Cooperation between Interest and Dependency 
 The conservatives’ attempt to limit the influence of DTV on campuses across 
Iran was meant to silence the younger cadres of the Islamic left, but in reality, as it 
turned out, it ended up providing DTV with new ideological tools that could be used to 
recruit the rising number of university students, particularly females, against the 
conservatives’ project of society. Thus, in the 1990s, expansion of higher education 
provided the reformists and the Islamic left with the opportunity to strengthen their links 
with the students.  
 When Mohammad Khatami launched his presidential campaign in 1996 
referring to ‘democracy,’ ‘civil society,’ and ‘rule of law,’ students were called to 
become active through DTV.42 The activism in favour of Khatami during his campaign 
and his first few years in power confirmed the ‘democratic radicalization’ of DTV, 
whereby students participated to what they believed was the construction of a new 
political system where genuine pluralism would emerge. This mobilisation of students 
in his favour was extremely useful to Khatami because it provided the backbone of his 
campaign when it came to logistics. At this stage student activism became very much 
linked to the discourse of democratisation43 and DTV genuinely believed in Khatami’s 
15 
 
democratising potential whereby significant changes would take place within the 
original revolutionary framework. During Khatami’s first mandate and on the occasion 
of the 2000 Parliamentary elections, higher education institutions became a real 
stronghold of the then-government and the reformist coalition Dovvom-e Khordad. At 
the time, DTV not only offered logistical and propaganda support to the reformist front, 
but it directly participated to the Dovvom-e Khordad. According a former member, 
DTV’s enthusiastic embrace of the reformist rhetoric of democracy, civil society and 
rule of law was in retrospect seen not as an autonomous choice but simply an alignment 
with the dominant discourse of the Islamic left – turned reformist.44 Despite the fact that 
this argument may be too critical of the student movement, there is a degree of truth in 
it. The DTV was then dependent on the reformist elite in terms of visibility, leadership 
and intellectual elaboration, even if soon it would start to develop its own political 
autonomy on the basis of the reformist political discourse and electoral base.  
 During the first years of Khatami’s government, the loyalty DTV showed him 
was rewarded with a positive attitude towards the students and their demands. Khatami 
had considerable power in the realm of student politics because the president is also the 
head of the Council of the Cultural Revolution. This Council supervises the nomination 
of university chancellors, approves curricula, selects student candidates, and finally 
promotes the ideological and political order on campuses. In this sense, Khatami’s 
presidency represented an opportunity for DTV and student activism to become more 
politically relevant. For instance, after the reformists won the 2000 parliamentary 
election, the Mosharekat party, Khatami’s party, supported the establishment of a 
‘student faction’ within the sixth Parliament (2000–2004). This faction was headed by 
Ali Akbar Moussavi Khoeini, a former DTV leader like the other members: Fatemeh 
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Haqiqatjou, Ali Tajrania, Meysam Saidi, and Reza Yusefian.45 Furthermore, the shared 
feeling among the students was that DTV would have enhanced Iran’s democratization 
by supporting the reformists in their political struggle against the conservatives and the 
Supreme leader Khamenei. This honeymoon with Khatami illustrates the mutually 
beneficial relation between the government and the DTV. Beyond being simply co-
opted by the state, the DTV enhanced its political visibility, while the government had a 
tight grip on the campuses. If we consider the strength of the dominant discourse on 
democratization and civil society, it is not a surprise that many scholars defended the 
idea that student activism leads to democratisation. But when such slogans did not 
become a reality, later, members of DTV accused their fellows of having been co-opted, 
and advocated political independence.  
 
Patterns of Conflict between Marginalisation and Path-dependency  
 Student protests erupted in July 1999 when the conservative-dominated 
Parliament amended the press legislation. Students considered the new law as an attack 
to freedom of speech because it was clear that it was meant to target the well-known 
Islamic-leftist newspaper Salam. After days of mobilisation, the protests turned violent 
owing to the repression carried out by paramilitary forces. While protesting, the 
students shouted slogans in favour of Khatami’s government, since the attack against 
Salam was perceived as a warning from the conservatives to the government. To the 
surprise of the students, Khatami did not side with them, labelling the protests ‘an attack 
on national security.’46 Many other prominent reformists followed Khatami’s line47 and 
later in 2000, the reformists put forth the idea of ‘active calm,’ a strategy designed for 
the students who should side with the reformists in the government uncritically and by 
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avoiding turmoil in the streets.48 The July 1999 incident instilled a feeling of betrayal 
among students and gave rise to a period of self-criticism regarding the role of students 
in politics. This internal debate took place very much behind the scenes due to DTV’s 
engagement in the electoral coalition Dovvom-e Khordad for upcoming municipal, 
parliamentary and presidential elections, 49 but in 2002 DTV split in two branches and 
later in several smaller groups which spanned a huge ideological arc, ranging from 
conservatism to radical liberalism.50 The Allameh branch, the majority, advocated an 
independent opposition to the conservatives, beyond the alliance with the reformists. 
The Allameh students were determined to act as a sort of ‘watchdog’ of the government, 
which was judged as being unable to foster democracy in Iran.51 The Shiraz branch, the 
minority, joined the conservative camp. In this new context of opposition to both the 
conservatives and reformists, considered by now too moderate, the Allameh students 
extended connections outside the university because, in their opinion, only an extra-
institutional alliance of civil society actors could bring about democratization.52 The 
students’ attitude towards the reformists hardened over time and they were therefore 
accused by them of acting illegally,53 helping the conservative backlash and lacking a 
political vision. According to reformists, the students would soon be ‘swept away like 
grains of sand, no longer protected by the desert,’54 a metaphor indicating the precarious 
condition of DTV without factional protection. Contrary to the students, who advocated 
the need for action and even rupture with the anti-reform elements of the Islamic 
republic, the reformists felt the responsibility of the sustainability of the system as a 
whole, which they wanted to transform slowly.  
It is no surprise that from 2002 the relationship between DTV as a whole and the 
government deteriorated. Furthermore, in 2003 the Allameh branch decided officially to 
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abandon the Dovvom-e Khordad front, and since then boycotting elections became its 
policy. Students no longer trusted the reformists and their role of ‘democratizers’ 
because they were too embedded in the institutional politics of an authoritarian 
regime.55 The rupture was so dramatic that Khatami’s visit at the University of Tehran 
in December 2004, on the occasion of the Students Day celebration, was transformed 
into an angry rally against him.56 Abdollah Momeni, a leader of the DTV, declared that 
‘bridges have been broken between us and him since several years ago… we knew that 
he (Khatami) could not give satisfactory answers to the students.’57  
The interpretation of student politics and civil society as counter-power to the 
government became widespread among the student groups, who increasingly diversified 
probably thanks to the relative weakness of the DTV. The rhetoric of civil society and 
democratisation acquired then a new meaning. They were the pillars of the reformists’ 
discourse and justified students' collaboration: in order to strengthen civil society, 
supporting the government was a more than acceptable compromise for the students. 
But this same rhetoric turned into a call for resistance to co-optation after that, 
according to the students, Khatami proved to be unable to genuinely democratise the 
system. If this rhetoric had first constituted the discourse of power, through which 
Khatami was able to gather support for his reform plan, it later embodied the meaning 
of resistance and counter-power.’58 This vision was rooted in the ‘mythology of student 
resistance’ and perpetual mobilization against authoritarianism, an idea which 
stimulated students to act according to this (self)-representation. Thus, students began 
acting as a vanguard of change, progress and democracy, and criticized the government 
for not doing enough to establish a democratic government in Iran. In an interview Ali 




‘Students are critics. So they are observant about events around them and look at issues in 
a critical manner […] students are the children of society and, because of their awareness 
and knowledge, they cannot remain silent or indifferent to what is going on in the nation 
[…] Even when the slogans of the student movement appear to be similar to those of the 
reformist groups, their ultimate goals are different. The goal of freedom for the students is 
not aimed at attaining political power. It is based on deep beliefs in human rights, and the 
dignity of mankind. Let me give you an example. When Khatami talked of civil society, 
this was the call of the university groups too. But when he attained the presidency, it 
became clear that his understanding of this notion was different from what the students 
wanted and believed in.’59 
 
Students acted following their supposed nature, that is mobilizing and criticizing 
the established and institutional power.  
 
Political parties have tried to infiltrate the student movement [...] This has been an 
obstacle. Reform parties have always wanted the student movement to be following them 
so that they would devise the strategy for the students. But the student movement 
gradually became independent [...] distancing itself from power. So today it is in a 
completely different position, which is closer to its natural point and where it should be. 
[...] Now that it is separated from power (i.e. the regime) and does not participate in 
elections, it must have a new strategy.60  
 
 Paradoxically, the students’ desire for political pluralism and individual rights 
was quashed when the newly-elected Ahmadinejad reinforced the regime’s grip on 
universities and student activism. The fear of being victim of cooptation and 
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instruments of a factional chess game pushed the students away from the reformists to 
claim an autonomous identity, depriving the reformist government of an important ally 
and causing further frustration among the students, since the planned student-led role in 
the country’s democratization did not become a reality. On the contrary, students are 
described as growingly uninterested in politics, apathetic61 and further marginalised by 
the new academic policy enacted by Ahmadinejad. 
 The independent attitude of DTV was interpreted as a betrayal by the reformists, 
who feared the loss of their ‘transmission belt’ of consensus among the youth and the 
students. The mobilisation resources of DTV were effective and evident: in 1997, 1999 
and 2000 the students mobilised a huge portion of society in support of the reformist 
and against the conservatives’ policies. From the point of view of the government, this 
evolution towards independence was in some way an ‘unintended' development of 
student activism, after two decades of loyalty and collaboration.  However, the break-up 
of the alliance strongly damaged DTV as well because they became a marginal political 
and social actor. This weakness paved the way for Ahmadinejad, elected president in 
2005, to carry out his normalisation project of campuses.62 Autonomy and demands for 
political pluralism did not lead to success; quite the contrary, they led to political 
oblivion.   
 With Ahmadinejad in power, the campuses became the main stage for the 
struggle between the pro-government students, organised in bassij units, and the 
opposition student groups, the DTV-Allameh and other minor forces. Despite dissent 
surviving across campuses, the atmosphere turned oppressive to the point that the 
younger students feared to be seen with activists.63 Instead, ‘being a bassij is seen as 
more opportune and profitable’64 thanks to governmental support. Their presence on 
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campus was also reinforced by the easier access to university they enjoy thanks to the 
special quotas reserved to bassij. In 2004, the student bassij in Iranian universities were 
420,000, and in 2007 they became 600,000.65 The introduction of these measures has to 
some extents changed the composition of the student population. The ‘bassij policy’66 is 
important to Ahmadinejad and conservatives in post-Khatami years in order to remove 
fully the reformist hegemony over the students and university staff, which was further 
purged of ‘liberal’ and ‘Western’ elements.67 After Ahmadinejad’s election, the DTV 
was explicitly targeted by the government and prevented from organising the election 
for the Central Committee or its own meetings, which eventually were held off 
campus.68 Active students are also targeted by the ‘starring process:’ ‘being starred’ 
means suffering consequences which span from the inability to enrol to the withdrawal 
of the right to continue education.69 Despite the revival of student activism in 2009 and 
the fact that oppositional or critical forces are present on campuses, as the numerous 
demonstrations against Ahmadinajead’s visits to universities all over Iran have shown, 
the continuous repression and tight control have undoubtedly changed the patterns of 
student activism in Iran.70  
 
Conclusion 
 Far from being ‘simply’ a prominent democratization actor, student activism in 
authoritarian settings has a much more complex role. While numerous studies indicate 
that student activism has indeed been crucial in processes of regime change, insufficient 
attention has been paid to the circumstances under which it contributes to strengthen 
authoritarian rule. The case of Iran demonstrates that there are two different ways in 
which this occurs. First, much like many other civil society actors, student activism can 
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be co-opted and at times willingly so because of a coincidence of material and/or 
ideological interests. This is certainly the case of DTV from its inception until the late 
1990s. Second, even when student activism genuinely pushes for democratization and 
becomes an anti-system actor that is independent and autonomous from political power, 
the authoritarian constraints in place can contribute to marginalize it and defeat it, 
rendering ineffective.  
 The DTV’s case highlights the problems student activism faces when it attempts 
to disengage from the dominant structures of authoritarian politics and pursue a truly 
independent and autonomous path. After the revolution, benefits in cooperating with the 
regime were obtained by students of DTV in so far as the only organisation present on 
campus enjoyed a political monopoly over students’ activities and many of its leaders 
were subsequently recruited into national elite. This type of relationship continues in 
many ways throughout the 1990s when student organizations are restructured to follow 
the similar reconfiguration of power within the political system of the Islamic Republic. 
After Khatami’s election in 1997, some political room opened up for the students thanks 
to both the rhetoric of civil society empowerment, which cherished student activism, 
and their support to Khatami’s governments. The students’ political weight increased, 
so did their visibility and capability of mobilization. In the 2000s, students radicalized 
their demands for democracy and decided to opt for political autonomy from the then-
reformist government, which was rhetorically committed to open up the system, but 
failed to do so causing major disillusion among the students. However, despite 
eschewing co-optation and being sincerely committed to a democratic change, the 
students’ strategy contributed to a conservative backlash and failed to produce a spilling 
over of democratic demands in society. This was partly because reformists were left 
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without an important constituency of support and partly because the reformists were 
afraid of students’ radicalism and marginalized them. In conclusion, even when 
demands for democratization are genuine, marginalisation and political defeat can be 
the outcome. In line with Jamal, it can be argued that structural constraints put forth by 
authoritarianism overwhelm even the best purposes an organization can make about 
democracy.  
 While the Iranian case might be somewhat different from other authoritarian 
settings in so far as intra-regime divisions are allowed to appear in the public and 
institutional spheres, it can be argued that it has comparative relevance because it 
demonstrates how patterns of activism, and in this case of student activism, may not 
necessarily follow the democratization framework, but can have a much more 
problematic and complex development.   
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